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The objects of consciousness: 
a non-computational model of cell assemblies 
Abstract 
The premise of this paper is that an adequate model of consciousness will be able to account 
for the fundamental duality in experience typified by thought and feeling, objectivity and 
subjectivity, science and art, and that it will do so without any of these terms assimilating its 
counterpart.  The paper argues that such an account is possible using existing models of the 
cell assembly, but only if consciousness is conceived in structural rather than information-
processing terms.  To this end, the paper contests the viability of information-processing 
models that identify consciousness with a substrate-independent flow of information, and 
instead identifies consciousness with the physical structure of the cell assembly itself.  This 
allows a fuller and more parsimonious account of consciousness than existing information-
processing models, as well as the integration of a range of key related matters from the fields 
of neuroanatomy, psychology, philosophy, and the physical sciences. 
Overview of cell assemblies 
The networks of neurons that populate the brain go by a range of names including ‘neuronal 
ensembles’, ‘neural networks’, and ‘cell assemblies’.  These terms are often synonymous, but 
the present paper focusses on the cell assembly (CA), best known from the work of Donald 
Hebb (1949).  Although ‘there is no general agreement on its definition’, the CA (cell 
assembly) is generally understood as an ‘organized collection of neurons’ that functions as an 
‘internal cognitive process’ and thereby ‘represents a particular concept’ such as an object.1  
CAs are populations of neurons, and the term ‘population coding’ denotes a fundamental 
principle of cell assemblies whereby a given concept is ‘coded by a set of neurons that fire at 
an elevated rate when the concept is perceived’ or recalled (H&P, p. 266).  Population coding 
is contingent with ‘overlapping coding’, another tenet of Hebb’s theory according to which 
‘some, perhaps most, neurons participate in multiple CAs’, and ‘new concepts composed of 
                                                        
1 Huyck & Passmore, 2013, pp. 263-4; Harris, 2005, p. 403. Subsequent references to Huyck & Passmore (2013) 
will be abbreviated to ‘H&P’.  All italic emphasis in quotations is my own. 
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pieces of old concepts will contain some new neurons, though they will also contain some of 
the neurons from the base concepts’ (H&P, p. 275).    
The CA comes into being as ‘an anatomically dispersed set of neurons among which 
excitatory connections have been potentiated’ due to repeated co-activation of those 
neurons.  The ‘theory is based on the premise, now known as Hebb’s rule, that synaptic 
connections become strengthened by synchronous activity of presynaptic and postsynaptic 
neurons’ (Harris, 2005, p. 400).  In other words, CAs are learned (i.e. established by 
experience), and once established, a CA is able to ‘act as a categoriser of sensory stimuli’ such 
that ‘the presentation of an object (for example, an orange) to an individual may cause a 
particular CA to become active, allowing the individual to identify the object as an orange.’  
Moreover, the same CA can also ‘be activated without direct sensory stimuli, so a person’s CA 
for [an] orange will ignite when they think about an orange’.  ‘The CA hypothesis (and indeed 
Hebb’s related learning rule) has been increasingly supported by biological, theoretical, and 
simulation data since it was made’ (H&P, p. 263).  
Overview of information-processing models of the brain 
In recent decades, CA modelling has been influenced by the widespread hypothesis that the 
brain is a structure or hierarchy of information-processing units.  In this paper, the term 
‘information processing’ refers to any model that presents the brain (either in part or totality) 
as an input-operation-output system in which the throughput is encoded and processed as 
information.  This information-processing paradigm has become the textbook account of 
functional brain anatomy, whereby both neurons and the larger brain systems of which they 
are component parts are described as information processors.2  At the micro level, this 
information processing is typified by the signalling between neurons, across synapses, by 
neurotransmitters; at the macro level the brain itself constitutes the processor, whereby ‘the 
primary input to the brain comes from our senses’, and the ‘primary output of the brain is the 
control of our muscles and movements, which are the basis of behaviour and language’ (Hill, 
2014, p. 121).  The functional relations between these inputs and outputs can broadly be 
                                                        
2 See, for example, Crossman and Neary, 2000, p. 33. 
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described as ‘cognition’, which is also conceived in information-processing terms as the 
‘mental activities involved in acquiring and processing information’ (Colman, 2015).   
For brevity, I will refer to information-processing based models as ‘IP models’, and take them 
to be most fully exemplified by computational models of the brain.  Computational models 
assert that even though brains are radically different from existing computers, they share a 
fundamental identity insofar as both are systematic information processors (Dehaene, 2014, 
p. 106).  The computational model is typified by the claim that brains ‘surely encode 
information’ by (for example) ‘transducing inputs into patterns of chemical and electrical 
information’; that they operate ‘over that encoded information’; and that brains therefore 
‘are computers, in the sense of being systems that operate over inputs and manipulate 
information systematically’ (Marcus, 2014, p. 209). 
Critique of IP models of consciousness 
Recent work on cell assemblies has likewise proceeded in terms of information processing, 
based on the premise that in the CA itself, ‘information is passed between neurons’ in the 
form of neuronal spike trains (H&P, p. 266).  The present paper will contest this position by 
arguing (i) that IP modelling of the brain is only possible if the singular nature of 
consciousness is overlooked, and (ii) that developing an adequate brain-based model of 
consciousness—i.e. one that does attend sufficiently to its unique character—will require 
relinquishing the IP hypothesis entirely.  In making this argument, the term ‘consciousness’ is 
used to refer to awareness, that is to say the experiential character of brain activity—‘the 
state or fact of being mentally conscious or aware of something’.3 
Consciousness presents unique problems to scientific inquiry due to its subjective character, 
and in consequence consciousness has not been a mainstream subject of investigation in 
neuroscience.4  For example, Huyck and Passmore’s 2013 review of over 200 academic 
publications on cell assemblies does not mention ‘consciousness’ once.  Such reticence is well 
founded because when the character of consciousness is sufficiently attended to, IP-based 
models exhibit two serious problems, viz (i) the explanatory gap, and (ii) what will be referred 
                                                        
3 OED (Oxford English Dictionary) Online. Oxford University Press, September 2016. Hereafter OED 
4 There are notable exceptions such as the work of Stanislas Dehaene 
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to as ‘the locale problem’.  In brief, the explanatory gap is the failure of IP models to provide 
a persuasive account of why consciousness feels like it does; while the locale problem is the 
failure of IP models to provide a persuasive account of the spatiotemporal locale of 
consciousness.  A fuller account of both problems, together with an explanation of why they 
are endemic to IP models are given in the appendix.  The immediate aim of this paper, 
however, is to offer a brain-based, non-IP model of consciousness, and to show how this non-
IP model not only avoids the problems inherent in IP models, but has altogether greater 
explanatory power with regards to consciousness itself. 
As mentioned above, CAs instantiate ‘concepts’.  These concepts include representations of 
physical objects, and this type of CA forms the focus of the present paper as it most clearly 
relates Hebb’s model to the broader questions of perception, memory, and representation 
that this paper takes up, as well as to the entailed matters of subjectivity and objectivity.  In 
order to show the distinct way in which CAs instantiate representations of physical objects, 
the model begins with a brief preliminary account of the general structure of physical 
objects, in contrast to that of informational representations of those same objects.  
The structure of physical objects 
All physical objects have two aspects: every object is both (i) a unitary entity that can be 
meaningfully distinguished from other objects, and (ii) a spatiotemporally-distributed 
structure of that object’s constituent elements.5  At any scale—from atomic to cosmic—the 
character of a given object derives not simply from the totality of its constituent parts, but 
from the spatiotemporal relations of those parts.  For example, a block of ice, a pool of water, 
and a cloud of steam may have the same constituent elements as one another (H2O 
molecules), but the spatiotemporal relations between those parts differs in each case, and 
those differences give these objects their distinct characteristics.  The ‘relations’ under 
discussion here are not a figure of speech, they are space and time themselves, the 
dimensions through which any given object has its physical being, its place in the cosmos.  
Physical objects could not exist if their constituent elements had no spatiotemporal extension 
(as in the state of the universe before the Big Bang), yet that spatiotemporal distribution is 
                                                        
5 The term ‘object’ is synonymous with ‘system’ in this context 
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not a constituent element, as such, of the objects themselves; space and time (and by 
extension, causality) are only manifest in and through objects.  
The structure of information 
In these terms, the key difference between a physical object and an informational 
representation of that same object is that while any given physical object is a unique, 
material instantiation of a spatiotemporal structure, the informational representation of that 
object is not.  For example, if either the constituent elements or the spatiotemporal structure 
of a physical object is changed, then the object itself is changed (as in the ice-water-steam 
example above).  This is not, however, true of the informational representations of that same 
object: a digitized image, set of measurements, descriptive account, and so on, are not bound 
to a specific physical form, and the same digitized information could be instantiated on 
paper, in silicon, in pulses of light, and so forth. 
This distinction matters for the question of consciousness because even though the brain 
itself is a physical object (i.e. a spatiotemporal structure of constituent elements), IP models 
hypothesize that states of consciousness (as information processes or outputs) have no 
intrinsic relationship to the underlying structural states of the brain.6  As Matteo Carandini 
puts it, neural computations ‘resemble a set of instructions in a computer language, which 
does not map uniquely onto a specific set of transistors, or serve solely the needs of a specific 
software application’ (Carandini, 2014, p. 181).  In other words, in IP models, the flow of 
information that is assumed to constitute consciousness is not bound to a specific physical 
form or ‘hardware’: it is decoupled from the brain’s neural substrate and could, in principle, 
be instantiated in an entirely different substrate such as silicon.  This is the basis of the claim 
that ‘research in neural computation needs not rest on an understating of the underlying 
biophysics’ (Carandini, 2014, p. 180).  And it is this decoupling of consciousness from brain 
through the medium of information processing that the present paper contests. 
Contesting the information-processing hypothesis is not a radical enterprise given that neural 
encoding is itself not proven.  As Gary Marcus—a strong advocate of computational models—
writes, ‘we know (or think we know) roughly what neurons do, and that they communicate 
                                                        
6 See appendix for more detail 
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with one another, but not what they are communicating’ (pp. 214).  And although neural 
spike trains in CAs may be evidence for temporal coding, other explanations are available: for 
example, they ‘might instead reflect an underlying organization of cell assemblies’ (Harris, 
2005, p. 399).  Nonetheless, the idea that consciousness may be grounded in something 
other than information processing has been deemed ‘pre-scientific’ (Dehaene, 2014, p. 262), 
so it should be emphasized at this point that the present model invokes no exotic concepts 
such as panpsychism.  More specifically, this paper does not contest the existence of 
signalling within CAs at the biophysical level, but it does contest the interpretation of this 
neural activity as the encoding, transmission, and processing of information.  By analogy, the 
pulse is an intrinsic part of bodily function, and a raised or lowered, strong or weak pulse can 
be read as indications of that body state, but this does not mean that the pulse pattern is a 
stream of encoded information that has been processed by the heart.   
In short, CAs are not necessarily information processors, but they are by definition neural 
structures (H&P, p. 264), and the present paper argues that their structural characteristics 
offer a stronger basis for a model of consciousness than any putative IP function.  Hence 
instead of interpreting the synaptic activity of neurons in a CA as the encoding and 
transmission of information prior to its later manifestation as consciousness, the non-IP 
model conceives that activity as the interrelated elements of a single neural-conscious object 
(the CA) interoperating as a unified whole and thereby manifesting a specific conscious 
experience.  This changes the key question in this area from one of how consciousness might 
be an outcome of information processing, to one of how the structure of conscious states 
correlates to the structure of brain states. 
Cell assemblies as ‘neural-conscious’ objects 
Information processing is predicated on input-operation-output systems which inherently 
push consciousness (as output) downstream of input (e.g. cortical stimulation).7  As there is 
no persuasive model of how this conscious output is instantiated (see appendix), the present 
model proposes that even without an explanatory mechanism for consciousness, brain 
                                                        
7 Even parallel and re-entrant IP systems are inherently linear because of the movement from input, through 
processing, to output.   
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modelling is both better served and more parsimonious if consciousness is located in situ at 
the point of neural activity.  The non-IP model therefore locates the conscious experience at 
the site of the CA itself, meaning no intermediary encoding or processing of information is 
required between stimulation of the CA and the corresponding conscious experience.  Hence 
in the non-IP model the CA constitutes both (i) a neural object, and (ii) the corresponding 
conscious experience, and CAs can therefore be described as ‘neural-conscious’ objects. 
As neural-conscious objects, CAs allow consciousness to be modelled as a physically-
structured experience rather than as a physically-decoupled flow of information.  This is 
because CAs, like other physical objects, are themselves organized structures of constituent 
elements.  This structure derives from the formation of the CA: for example, repeated 
sensing of a given physical object stimulates a specific combination of neurons in the sensory 
cortices, and connections (e.g. strengthened synapses) are thereby established between 
those neurons, resulting in the creation of the relevant cell assembly.  The object of 
perception is thereby reflected in two different aspects of the CA: the neuronal ‘nodes’ (i.e. 
the specific neurons in the sensory cortices stimulated by the physical object), and the neural 
structure (i.e. the connections between those neurons which reflect the spatiotemporal 
structure of the object of perception itself).  And because the CA is both a physical (neural) 
structure and the corresponding conscious experience, the dual-aspect character of the 
former is reflected in the dual-aspect character of the latter.  In the discussion that follows, 
these dual experiential aspects of the CA will be referred to as ‘phenomenal’ and ‘noumenal’ 
consciousness. 
Phenomenal consciousness: structure and character 
In this paper, the term ‘phenomenal’ refers to that which is known to the senses, and is used 
with particular reference to the experience of physical objects.  And because the non-IP 
model locates consciousness in situ at the point of neural activity, any CA that corresponds to 
the phenomenal apprehension of a physical object will necessarily be at least partly located 
in the relevant sensory cortices (cf. H&P, p. 272 ff.).  For example, Stanislas Dehaene provides 
the following account of a CA corresponding to a given physical object (in this case, a fire 
extinguisher): 
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All the neurons in a cell assembly support one another by sending excitatory pulses.  As a result, 
they form a delimited ‘hill’ of activity in neural space.  And because many such local assemblies 
can activate independently at different places in the brain, the outcome is a combinatorial code 
capable of representing billions of states.  For instance, any visual object can be represented by a 
combination of color, size, and fragments of shapes.  Recordings from the visual cortex support 
this idea: a fire extinguisher, for instance, seems to be encoded by a combination of active 
‘patches’ of neurons, each comprising a few hundred active neurons and each representing a 
particular part (handle, body, hose, etc.)  
(2014, p. 175) 
As Dehaene shows here, the CA is made up of constituent elements (in this case the ‘color, 
size, and fragments of shapes’) located in the sensory cortices.  These rudimentary elements 
of sense experience are sometimes termed ‘protophenomena’, and it is ‘generally assumed 
that the firing of neurons linked by synapses within microscopic circuits gives rise to the basic 
phenomena of mind-making, conveniently called the “protophenomena” of cognition’ 
(Damasio, 2012, p. 252). 
The current paper takes ‘protophenomena’ in its literal sense (‘proto’: early stage; 
‘phenomena’: ‘known to the senses’) to refer specifically to the constituent elements of 
sensory (i.e. phenomenal) experience.  These protophenomena, located in the sensory 
cortices, are not individual neurons, but small neuronal populations.  They are functionally 
‘atomic’ because they correspond to sensory experiences (such as seeing a uniform patch of 
colour) that do not resolve into more fundamental perceptual elements.  Through 
overlapping coding, these protophenomena are foundational to many different, larger CAs, 
meaning that from a comparatively sparse vocabulary of protophenomenal resources it is 
possible to have consciousness of, as Dehaene puts it, ‘billions of states’.   
The structure and character of perceptual objects 
Our ability to perceive objects depends on the capabilities of these protophenomena.  This is 
because the human senses are able to detect some aspects of physical objects but not others 
(for example, the naked eye can see a pool of water, but not the individual water molecules).  
Moreover, some of the more familiar characteristics of perceptual objects, such as colour, do 
not actually inhere in physical objects themselves.  In consequence, there is not a simple 
correlation between objects in themselves and objects as perceived.  To mark this distinction, 
the term ‘physical objects’ will be used to refer to the things in themselves, while the term 
‘perceptual objects’ will be used to refer to objects as they are known through the senses 
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(i.e. as they are established as CAs).  Yet despite this distinction, the relationship between 
physical and perceptual objects is not arbitrary.  There is a coherent, structured relationship 
between the two, sufficient that we can recognize the same objects across space and time, 
and that we live in a world of shared perceptual objects with our fellow beings.  This 
correlation is provided for by the nature of the CA, and will be described in more detail 
below. 
Noumenal consciousness: structure and character 
To recap, the non-IP model proposes that (i) consciousness is present at the level of the CA 
itself, instantiated as protophenomenal populations located in the sensory cortices, and (ii) 
these protophenomena can combine, through co-activation, in the CAs that constitute 
perceptual objects.  Yet this is not the whole story, because the co-activation of the 
constituent parts of a CA does not in itself instantiate the perceptual object as a unified 
entity, but merely the consciousness of its constituent protophenomenal parts.  Recognizing 
a given physical object requires not simply awareness of those constituent parts, but the 
ability to grasp that particular combination and interrelation of parts as constituting a unitary 
object.  As will be seen, this is not a rhetorical distinction: the difference between seeing only 
the parts, and seeing those parts as a unified whole, is powerfully exemplified by visual 
agnosia, a condition in which this ability is impaired such that ‘the individual has intact 
elementary vision but cannot identify the nature of objects’ (Crossman & Neary, 2000, p. 
147). 
The matter can be brought into focus by this question: what is it that differentiates (i) 
consciousness of a number of unrelated protophenomena (such as ‘colors, sizes, and 
fragments of shape’), from (ii) consciousness of the same protophenomena as constituting a 
unitary perceptual object (such as a fire extinguisher)?  It is not the introduction of any 
additional protophenomenal elements, as they are the same in each case.  In the non-IP 
model, the answer is provided by the nature of the CA itself.  As has been said, the CA exists 
due to repeated co-activation of its constituent neurons which establishes a ‘high mutual 
synaptic strength’ between them: that is to say, a CA is not only an assemblage of co-
activated protophenomenal elements, but also a physical structure of associations between 
those elements (H&P, p. 264).  And because in the non-IP model, consciousness is located at 
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the level of the CA itself, those neural associations are not simply useful bits of ‘wiring’, but 
are—as an intrinsic part of the CA—a constituent part of the conscious experience that the 
CA in question instantiates. 
In the present model, these neural associations correlate to what will be referred to as 
‘noumenal’ consciousness, and it is this noumenal consciousness that enables the 
apprehension of the unity of objects.  For example, recognizing a fire extinguisher requires 
not only sensing the constituent protophenomena, but knowing that they are part of the 
same object, and recognizing their relational unity.  This noumenal knowing is not sensory, 
because it is not protophenomenal, rather, it corresponds to the neural association of the 
protophenomenal elements, and thereby constitutes a qualitatively distinct type of 
consciousness.  In short, CAs have a dual-aspect structure, viz (i) the neuronal (e.g. 
protophenomenal) elements, and (ii) the neural associations of those elements; and the dual 
aspects of this structure correspond to the dual aspects of consciousness, viz (i) the 
phenomenal—‘that which can be known by the senses’, and (ii) the noumenal—that which is 
‘knowable only by the mind or intellect, not by the senses’ (OED). 8  Please note that in this 
context the terms ‘phenomenal’ and ‘noumenal’ refer only to consciousness at the level of 
the constituent parts of a CA (e.g. unorganized protophenomena), not to the apprehension of 
the CA as a unified object. 
At the cortical level, it might be inferred that this distinction between the phenomenal and 
the noumenal would map directly onto the widely-used distinction between ‘primary’ and 
‘associative’ cortex.  However, the latter terms are troubled (Zeki, 1993; Kaas, 1999), so the 
present model proceeds without invoking general cortical divisions into primary and 
associative areas.  Instead, the model assumes that the nature of the physical associations 
that structure the CA (e.g. strengthened synaptic connections between co-activated neurons) 
will differ in scale, locale, and intricacy depending on the type and complexity of the CA in 
question (H&P, p. 272).  After all, CAs can vary greatly in size, from an estimated 103 to 107 
neurons per CA, and the neural connections in large-scale CAs are more complex than the 
synaptic connections at the local level of protophenomena, given that the cortex may 
                                                        
8  This usage does not imply any wider (e.g. Kantian) meaning  
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‘support CAs that cross brain areas and thus integrate features over a range of complexities 
and modalities’ (H&P, pp. 264, 266).   
Normal object perception and recognition require both the phenomenal and noumenal 
aspects of consciousness to be intact, yet both are susceptible to damage.  In the case of the 
former, damage to protophenomena can mean loss of the phenomenal elements of 
sensation such as the ability to see (and imagine) a given colour (‘focal brain damage often 
causes simultaneous deficits in perception and imagery’ (Damasio, 2012, pp. 149-150)).  In 
the case of the latter, damage to the neural associations of those protophenomena can have 
an equally dramatic effect on sensory perception.  This is evident from lesion studies in which 
the ‘primary’ (i.e. protophenomenal) sensory cortex is intact, but the cortical associations 
between those protophenomenal elements are damaged.  The brief accounts of agnosia and 
amnesia that follow describe the impact of this sort of damage on the perception and recall 
of objects, and also on the recall of the relationships between objects. 
Agnosia as damage to cell assembly structure 
Visual agnosia ‘is caused by lesions in the visual association cortex, sparing primary visual 
cortex’ (Álvarez, 2016, p. 85).  The condition takes different forms because the association of 
protophenomena can be interrupted both at a fundamental level of the protophenomena 
themselves (‘visual form agnosia’), and at the level of the integration of those 
protophenomena into perceptual objects (‘associative visual agnosia’).  The two forms are 
outlined below. 
Visual form (‘apperceptive’) agnosia is the more rudimentary condition, in which individuals 
‘have an absolute inability to recognize the simplest forms, which impedes them from, for 
example, differentiating a straight line from a curve or determining the size of objects’ 
(Álvarez, 2016, p. 86).  In this case the protophenomena themselves are active but lack even 
the most basic structural organization: as Martha Farah puts it, there is ‘preserved stuff vision 
in the absence of thing vision’, ‘a kind of rich but formless visual goo’, which is to say ‘visual 
form agnosics lack the ability to group local visual elements into contours, surfaces, and 
objects’ (Farah, 2004, p. 18-19).  In short, at this rudimentary level the neuronal elements of 
perception are present, but not the structure; there is phenomenal consciousness but 
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without the organizing form of noumenal consciousness; the stimuli are registered but do not 
make sense.  Visual form agnosia is associated with damage to subcortical white matter in 
the occipital lobes and surrounding regions (Farah, 2004, p. 25).   
Associative visual agnosia, by contrast, appears to be a condition in which the 
protophenomena are functioning correctly, but there is damage at a neural level that 
interrupts their binding into CAs that correspond to more complex unitary objects (i.e. 
perceptual objects).  Hence an individual suffering from associative visual agnosia may be 
able to perceive the constituent parts of an object, but will have ‘disproportionate problems 
with the global structure of complex objects relative to simpler shapes or simpler parts of 
shapes’ (Farah, 2004, p. 77).  Here, noumenal consciousness is functional at the level of the 
organization of protophenomena into basic shapes, but not at the level of organization of 
those basic shapes into more complex objects. As might be anticipated, associative visual 
agnosia has a different neuropathology from visual form agnosia, and is usually associated 
with bilateral occipitotemporal lesions (Farah, 2004, p. 88). 
The agnosias indicate how, within a specific modality such as vision, damage to the structure 
of a CA impacts on the integrity of the perceptual object in question.  This matter of 
structural integrity may, however, extend beyond perceptual objects, as certain forms of 
amnesia—particularly those affecting episodic memory—present a corresponding case at a 
higher level of complexity again, whereby the perceptual objects that make up a 
remembered scene are intact, but the noumenal relations between them are interrupted 
such that the scene cannot be bound together, and the memory itself is lost. 
Amnesia as damage to cell assembly structure 
Memory is sometimes thought of as being like a photograph or film footage that is encoded 
as information, stored in the brain, and later retrieved.  This is the case in prevailing IP 
models of memory9 which depend on ‘distinct perceptual and mnemonic tokens’ such that 
‘visual recognition requires that memory be searched for a representation that resembles the 
current stimulus input’ (Farah, 2004, pp. 76, 72).  In the non-IP model however, memory is 
not a stored record of information, but is—as in the case of perception itself—a neural 
                                                        
9 See, for example, Burgess & Hitch (2005) 
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structure (i.e. CA) that can be reactivated.  This is why in the non-IP model a CA correlates to 
both the perceptual recognition of a given object and to the memory of that object: both the 
perception and the memory of a given object involve activation of the same CA, and the CA 
is, to borrow Martha Farah’s phrase, ‘a single perceptual-mnemonic representation’.  
Consequently, in the non-IP model, amnesia is not the loss of self-contained, photograph-like 
memories, rather it is the inability to establish or retain the associations between the 
relevant perceptual objects that would enable them to constitute a remembered scene, 
event, or narrative.10  So, whereas in visual agnosia there is an inability to recognize the 
spatial integration of parts into unitary objects, in some forms of amnesia there may be a 
corresponding inability to visualize the spatiotemporal integration of perceptual objects into 
unified scenes or narrative structures.  This non-IP model of memory is consistent with a 
range of recent work on memory, particularly on episodic memory and the hippocampus.   
Episodic memory is ‘long-term memory for personal experiences and events’ (Colman, 2015) 
and is dependent on the hippocampus: if the hippocampus is destroyed, episodic memory is 
lost.  Nonetheless, even in the face of such loss, the constituent elements of episodic 
memories—e.g. the CAs that correspond to perceptual objects—may remain intact: patients 
with hippocampal damage and a corresponding loss of the ability to recall scenes can 
nevertheless still bring to mind single objects (Maguire, et al., 2016, p. 432).  For example, 
the amnesic individual may not be able to recall the scene of a day at the beach, but may 
nonetheless be able to bring to mind the individual objects that might make up such a scene 
(the sea, the sun, a beach towel, and so on).  Hence in this kind of amnesia the loss seems to 
be not of the constituent perceptual objects themselves, but of the ability to bind those 
objects into spatially-unified or temporally-ordered scenes in the contexts of recall and 
visualization.  In response to such findings, Eleanor Maguire and colleagues have proposed a 
‘Scene Construction Theory’, which ‘posits that a primary function of the hippocampus is to 
facilitate the construction of scenes by allowing details to be martialled, bound, and played 
out in a coherent spatial context’ (Maguire, et al., 2015, p. 433). 
                                                        
10 See Rosenbaum, et al., 2005, and Maguire, et al., 2016 
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The cell assembly hypothesis is more usually associated with the mental instantiation of 
objects than of memories, but the latter is also present in Hebb’s work.  And although some 
of the recent works on memory use Richard Semon’s term ‘memory engram’ rather than 
Hebb’s ‘cell assembly’, they nonetheless draw on Hebb’s principles as the two models are 
cognate (Tonegawa, et al., 2015).  These recent studies provide empirical evidence that 
memories themselves are indeed cell assemblies (‘engram cell pathways’) distributed across 
multiple connected brain regions. ‘For instance, the hippocampus and the associated cortex 
are known to play a crucial role in episodic memories by associating the emotionally neutral 
components of the episode: information like what, where, and when’ (Tonegawa, et al., 
2015, p. 926).  In like manner, in the non-IP model, an episodic memory is a complex CA in 
which perceptual objects are co-activated in networks involving areas outside the sensory 
cortices including, critically, the hippocampus. 
Unity of perceptual objects 
In the cases above, amnesia impedes the recall of unitary scenes or narratives, while agnosia 
disrupts the unitary perception of objects.  Under normal perception, however, we 
experience perceptual objects in a unitary way.  For example, although we only ever see 
objects partially (due to perspective, occlusion, and so on), we do not live in a confusing 
world of fragments, but experience those partial glimpses as unitary entities.  This unitary 
experience of objects is not an optional supplement to perceptual awareness, as we cannot 
prevent ourselves from seeing perceptual objects as unitary forms (rather than as aggregates 
of disparate elements).  In other words, we cannot induce agnosia.  Why is this?  In the non-
IP model, perceptual objects are unitary experiences because of the way in which CAs are 
activated or ‘triggered’.  Take the example of vision: despite its composite, saccadic 
character, vision is not experienced as a flicker of successive images, nor of separate 
impressions of colour, shape, and movement.  This is because a given CA can ‘ignite’ (i.e. be 
activated in full) ‘when only a small subset of its neurons initially fire’ (H&P, p. 265).  For 
instance, ‘an object partially hidden behind another one can frequently be identified’ 
because ‘full ignition of a cell assembly’ is able to occur when only some of its neurons are 
stimulated – such as when an object is glimpsed (Pulvermüller, 1999, p. 256).  And because a 
given CA is both the neural and the conscious counterpart to a given perceptual object, when 
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that CA is triggered (i.e. partially stimulated), it can ignite in full, meaning that the CA (i.e. the 
perceptual object) becomes conscious in its totality almost immediately.  In this way, the 
smoothness of perceptual experience is accounted for by the relative stability of established 
CAs: CAs are the stable neural-conscious unities that underlie the flux of sensory stimulation.  
As stated earlier, consciousness is not a stream of processed sense data, but the activation of 
the CAs—and therefore the corresponding conscious states—to which the initial stimuli 
correlate. 
Words and concepts 
In the examples considered so far, the unitary character of the perceptual object (i.e. CA) 
derives from the unitary character of the corresponding physical object, and once that 
perceptual object has been established, any sensory stimulation provided by the 
corresponding physical object (such as a glimpse of it) will ignite the CA, instigating a 
perceptual recognition of the whole.  This ignition can, however, also be triggered by stimuli 
that are not a part of—and do not derive from—the physical object in question.  This can 
occur through the association of words with objects, whereby the association of a given word 
with a given object allows them to function as a single CA.  The word ‘dog’, for example, can 
ignite the relevant perceptual object (i.e. mental image) even though the word ‘dog’ itself 
does not derive from, and has no intrinsic physical or sensory relation to the object (animal) 
in question.  For the same reason, different languages can have different words for the same 
object. 
This independence of words from physical objects also allows words to act as triggers for 
perceptual formations that are organized by concepts rather than by the unitary character of 
objects themselves.  This is evident in our ability to name and recognize parts of objects even 
when those parts do not have an existence as independent physical units.  For example, a 
human body is a discrete, unitary, physical object, but a forehead, temple, or elbow is not.  
The latter are conceptually—but not physically—discrete parts of the body, the knowledge of 
which comes after the establishment of the perceptual object (CA) of which they are part (we 
recognize what a face is before we learn what a forehead or temple is).  Groups of discrete 
physical objects can likewise be grasped as unitary wholes (e.g. seeing stars as 
constellations), and again, this sort of conceptual grouping comes after we establish the 
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ability to perceive individual stars and the night sky at large.  These conceptual formations 
are not ‘natural’ (insofar as they are not determined by the unitary integrity of the physical 
objects themselves), but are cultural: they are public, conceptually-determined naming 
conventions that require learning. 
Conceptual objects 
Physical objects cannot be known directly (they are outside the body), but as has been 
shown, CAs are a means by which those objects may be instantiated as conscious 
experiences.  Moreover, CAs allow physical objects to be apprehended both as perceptual 
and as conceptual objects.  A perceptual object is the awareness of the phenomenal aspect 
of the CA, manifest as the unitary sensory apprehension of the physical object in question.  A 
conceptual object is the awareness of the noumenal aspect of the CA, manifest as the 
intellectual apprehension of the same physical object as a unitary structure of spatiotemporal 
relations. 
All objects—physical, perceptual, conceptual—are by definition unitary entities, but the 
unitary character of perceptual objects is different from that of conceptual objects. To grasp 
a physical object as a perceptual object, is to grasp it as a sensory whole, a phenomenal unity, 
a unified totality of protophenomena.  By contrast, to grasp a physical object as a conceptual 
object, is to grasp it not in phenomenal terms, but as the totality of spatiotemporal relations 
between its constituent parts; it is to know the object intellectually.  The difference is 
exemplified by the contrast between, say, the sight of a triangular patch of light, and the 
thought of ‘a plane rectilinear figure having three angles and three sides’ (OED). 
It is important to note at this point that perceptual objects are not simply ‘phenomenal 
objects’ and conceptual objects are not simply ‘noumenal objects’.  As the discussion of 
agnosia indicated, perceptual objects depend on both phenomenal and noumenal 
consciousness (i.e. on both the protophenomena themselves, and on their interrelations in 
the cell assembly).  This also holds true for conceptual objects, which despite instantiating 
intellectual (rather than sensory) apprehensions of objects, likewise depend on some level of 
phenomenal consciousness in order that those noumenal relations may be known at all (just 
as space and time are only made manifest in and through physical objects). 
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Although perceptual objects require noumenal consciousness, it remains muted, whereas in 
conceptual objects this noumenal aspect is to the fore, as conceptual objects are a more 
complex apprehension of the structure of physical objects that is predicated on the 
subdivision of the latter into constituent conceptual parts (as described earlier).  Once these 
parts are established and differentiated, the relations between them can be articulated, and 
it becomes possible to say of the object that this part is next to that, that is before this, after 
this will come that, and so on.  The ability to observe and articulate meaningful 
spatiotemporal relations (such as cause and effect) between parts of an object is what 
characterizes rational thought itself, and in the present model, conceptual objects are the 
basis of rational thought. 
The parts of a conceptual object are therefore related to one another in a similar fashion to 
the discrete but interrelated objects that constitute episodic memories (as described earlier).  
Indeed, the present model proposes that just as the same protophenomena may be common 
to a wide range of perceptual objects (via overlapping coding), so the same abstract 
spatiotemporal relations may be common to a wide range of conceptual objects (again via 
overlapping coding).  In consequence, these relations do not need to be established anew for 
every conceptual object, but rather the ‘over,’ ‘after,’ ‘above,’ and so on that obtain between 
the parts of one conceptual object may be shared not only by other conceptual objects, but 
also by, for example, the interrelated objects that constitute remembered or imagined 
scenes. 
In terms of the structure of the CA itself, the proposal is that while the protophenomenal 
elements of perceptual objects are located in the sensory cortices along with the 
corresponding ‘natural’ noumenal associations (i.e. those which are instantiated by the 
unitary form of the physical object itself, and which are susceptible to agnosia), the 
development of a conceptual understanding of those same objects may extend the structure 
of the CA in question outside the sensory cortex and into, for example, the hippocampus.   
Representational objects 
This final section of the paper offers greater detail on the distinction between conceptual and 
perceptual objects through their representational counterparts in scientific models and 
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works of art.  The significance of science and art in the present context is that they not only 
differ in their respective foci on objectivity and subjectivity, but that this difference is 
instantiated in their distinct representational forms.  Scientific models constitute abstract, 
analytical instantiations of the spatiotemporal relations between the elements of a given 
object, while works of art synthesize disparate materials into new phenomenal unities that 
embody subjective experience in a communicable form.  These two types of representation 
are incommensurable, which is why an equation is so different from a painting, an opera 
cannot be meaningfully performed in hexadecimal code, a scientific hypothesis cannot be 
usefully expressed as a watercolour, and so on. 
Scientific models 
Science is objective: it is concerned with the conceptual representation and understanding of 
physical objects.  The function of the scientific model, as a representational object, is to 
manifest the spatiotemporal relations that constitute the physical object under 
consideration.  Science is concerned with the spatiotemporal relationships between and 
within things (of a to b), not the things themselves (a, b).  As Niels Bohr concisely expressed 
it, the purpose of the scientific description of nature ‘is not to disclose the real essence of 
phenomena but only to track down as far as possible relations between the multifold aspects 
of our experience.’11 
This focus on the structure of physical objects is not concerned with invoking the subjective 
character of perception.  Scientific representation therefore instantiates these relations 
without reference to the perceptual character of the object under consideration.  The 
matters of concern here are abstract and relational: space, time, causation and so on have no 
independent phenomenal character.  The scientific model therefore bears no intrinsic 
relation to the phenomenal character of the object being modelled, it only requires 
component parts that manifest internal relations which correlate to those of the physical 
object in question.  For example, certain aspects of the spatiotemporal relationship of the 
sun to its satellites may be modelled by an orange and some walnuts, but a cup and some 
coins might do the job just as well.  This is because the phenomenal form of the 
                                                        
11 Quoted in Velmans and Schneider, 2007, p. 302 
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representation (walnuts, coins) is immaterial to the spatiotemporal relations under 
consideration, all that matters is that the materials have the capacity to model the object’s 
spatiotemporal relations with the desired degree of accuracy: the focus is on the 
spatiotemporal structure of the object, not its phenomenal character.  Because the latter is 
incidental to science, it can be pared down to a minimum, and the complexities of the 
cosmos can be modelled with the phenomenally-minimal language of mathematics and 
theoretical physics (variables, symbols, equations, formulae). 
To put that in other terms, scientific representation is abstract because it is not concerned 
with instantiating the sensory character of its subject: there is no colour, sound, or aroma to 
an equation.  Scientific hypotheses are not improved (as scientific hypotheses) by being set to 
music, or redrafted in iambic pentameter, and an oil painting of a molecule offers no 
advantage (and quite possibly disadvantages) over a blackboard sketch or a computer-
generated model of the same.  In this context, subjective responses would be a distraction, 
and scientific language is therefore objective, disinterested, unfeeling, and indifferent to the 
expressive qualities of language such as metaphor.  Scientific models do not speak the 
language of the body, senses, pain and pleasure, and therefore do not instantiate 
compassion, empathy, or subjectivity. 
Works of art 
Art is subjective: it provides an embodied experience.  To be a subject means to have a body, 
senses, and other corporeal experiences such as the emotions.  Art is only concerned with 
physical objects insofar as they are experienced through the body, i.e. as perceptual objects.  
The work of art instantiates the character of subjectivity as a representational object that can 
be shared with others.  It provides a sensory, emotional experience, a structure of feeling, 
not a piece of information. 
Whereas scientific models are conceptually unified, works of art are perceptually unified.  
Thought may contribute to the creation of a work of art, but the final work itself is not 
conceptual, abstract, or disembodied.  On the contrary, the composition of a work of art 
involves coordinating the relationship of its component elements (i.e. its materials), whatever 
they may be, into a harmonious and resonant relationship that itself constitutes a 
phenomenally-unified representational object.  If the work of art does not attain this unitary 
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character—if it is perceptually fragmented—the subjective experience will be broken up into 
elements that need to be conceptually related.12  This phenomenal dis-integration is an 
aesthetic shortfall equivalent to the failure to rationally integrate the elements of a scientific 
model. 
Art is not objective.  It is concerned with manifesting the character of subjectivity, not with 
the spatiotemporally exacting replication of physical objects (photographic reproduction is 
not the acme of artistic achievement).  To this end, art—unlike science—is not concerned 
with modelling accurate spatiotemporal relations between its elements, but rather with 
integrating those elements as a perceptual unity that discloses the character of subjectivity.  
Hence it is no error if a landscape painter moves buildings or magnifies mountains or renders 
vegetation as geometrical forms, nor if a dramatist conflates historical figures or dates.  This 
same latitude of interpretation is present in performance art, whether the reading of a poem, 
staging of a play, or playing of a musical score.  The re-forging of the relations of the 
constituent elements into a new unity can bring a new emotional dynamic to a work, one 
which would not be present were the piece to be rendered with complete accuracy by a 
computer.  A MIDI rendition of a piano sonata is not better than a virtuoso performance of 
the same, even though the former may have greater tonal, dynamic, and temporal 
consistency, and can be a more objective reproduction of the written score.  
To attain this perceptual unity, art is attentive in the highest degree to its materials and to 
the integration and synthesis of these materials into a sensual unity through the possibilities 
offered by metaphor, harmony, timbre, tone, proportion, colour, and so on.  These processes 
may interfere with objectivity, but allow works of art to manifest and feelingly communicate 
empathy, compassion, subjectivity, and so on. 
In conclusion 
To summarize: conscious experiences (exemplified in this paper by perceptual and 
conceptual objects) are not information-processing outputs, but the activation, however 
                                                        
12 It is, of course, possible to do this volitionally, to objectivize works of art by considering them in conceptual 
terms, and this is the function of art criticism etc.; in much the same way it is possible to subjective science, 
making it ‘fun’, ‘exciting’, ‘elegant’, and so on in the manner of popular science.  Whatever their merits, popular 
science and art criticism are second-order activities distinct from science and art themselves. 
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fleeting, of cell assemblies (i.e. as physical structures rather than information conduits).  A 
perceptual CA is established through encounters with a given physical object leading to 
repeated stimulation of the same group of protophenomena. The integrated structure of 
associations intrinsic to that CA (e.g. strengthened synaptic connections) reflect the 
spatiotemporal integrity (unitary form) of the physical object itself.  The dual-aspect nature of 
physical objects is thereby reflected in the dual-aspect structure of the CA, and this is the 
ground of the dual aspect (i.e. phenomenal and noumenal) character of consciousness.  This 
dual-aspect structure unites, and is common to physical objects, to CAs (as perceptual and 
conceptual objects), and to the representations of those objects as exemplified by scientific 
models and works of art.   
This non-IP model provides a structure and spatiotemporal locale for consciousness, a 
parsimonious account of perception and memory (and corresponding anomalies), a closure 
of the explanatory gap, a distinct account of the neural basis and dual-aspect character of 
consciousness, and a means to bind the matter of consciousness to that of space and time.  It 
does so by attending to the range and qualitative character of conscious experience— 
subjectivity as well as objectivity; feeling as well as thought; the arts as well as the sciences—
and without assimilating any of these terms to its counterpart. 
Appendix 
The locale problem 
IP models of consciousness typically envisage the brain as being composed of a diverse range 
of localized, unconscious information processors, variously referred to as ‘agents’, ‘units’, 
‘demons’, ‘homunculi’, and so on (Dennett, 1993, pp. 261-2; Dehaene, 2014, pp. 175-8).  
These processors operate in parallel, across functionally-differentiated areas of the brain, and 
loosely correspond to CAs.  In these computational models, consciousness itself is typically 
envisaged as ‘global information sharing’ of the outputs of these local unconscious 
processors, perhaps functioning as a ‘lingua franca’ across the different units (Dehaene, pp. 
163, 91).13  Such models are not, however, clear about the locale of consciousness, and 
whether it is intrinsic to that information-processing function, or an output of it. 
                                                        
13 for variations of the model, see, for example, Carandini, p. 177 ff., and Dennett, p. 276 ff. 
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For it to be intrinsic, consciousness would need to be endemic to the processing function 
whereby ‘global information sharing’ takes place.  But this operation is itself a mechanism—a 
‘router’ in Dehaene’s terms—a kind of Turingesque serial processing amid the parallel 
processing of the brain (Dennett, 1993; Dehaene, 2015), and the mechanical transparency of 
a router or a Universal Turing Machine offers no solution here because it reinstates the 
problem of Leibniz’s mill: all physical parts of the system can be inspected, but no 
consciousness found. 
Could, then, consciousness be an output of such a system?  Might the ‘input—operation—
output’ that characterizes processors be envisaged in terms of, say, ‘senses—cognition—
muscles’ (Hill, 2014)?  Here the physical system of inputs and outputs would be clear, but in 
the case of consciousness this model stalls because there is no physical counterpart to the 
muscles where consciousness, as an output of that process, might exist.  That is to say there 
is no post-processing locale where the various outputs of distributed unconscious processing 
might coalesce as conscious experience.  So although the distributed processing of 
computational models has the merit of avoiding problems such as the homunculus, the 
‘central meaner,’ and the ‘Cartesian theatre’ (Dennett, 1993), it does not overcome them.  
The alternative accounts that computational models offer—such as ‘global broadcasting’ to a 
‘global workspace’ (Dehaene, 2015)—do not solve the locale problem, but rather reinstate it 
in different terms, replacing consciousness-as-local-integration with consciousness-as-global-
distribution. 
Daniel Dennett, as an advocate of computational models of consciousness, is aware of this 
locale problem (1993, pp. 254-6), yet it persists in his own work.  Take a stick and touch 
things around you, he suggests, and the ‘transactions between stick and touch receptors 
under the skin […] provide the information [that] your brain integrates into a conscious 
recognition of the texture of paper, cardboard, wool, or glass, but these complicated 
processes of integration are all but transparent to consciousness’ (1993, p. 47).  Here 
Dennett invokes an unconscious information-processing stage (i.e. the ‘information’ 
undergoing ‘all but transparent’ ‘processes of integration’) from which the ‘conscious 
recognition’ emanates, but the model provides no spatiotemporal locale for the output of 
the processing (the ‘conscious recognition’) to occur. 
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In the face of this locale problem, computers offer a beguiling model of the brain not only 
because they are paradigmatic information processors, but because they implicitly 
circumvent the locale problem by outsourcing consciousness to users via interfaces such as 
screens, keyboards, and speakers.  This outsourcing can be deceptive, so to be clear: despite 
the claims of IP models, it is the computer operator—not the computer itself—that provides 
the locale, the ‘Cartesian Theatre’ in which the processed information ‘integrates into a 
conscious recognition’.  The attribution of consciousness to a computer in such an 
arrangement gets the model the wrong way round: the computer itself is not a conscious 
entity served by a passive user, rather the unconscious computer functions as an extended 
sense for the conscious user in a manner similar to the ‘extended mind’ of Andy Clark and 
David Chalmers (1998).  It is, moreover, noteworthy that the information-processing ability of 
computers is actually incidental to this role, which is why the extended mind model works 
equally well with a mobile phone, a paper notebook, a computer, or indeed a stick. 
The explanatory gap 
A widely-discussed difficulty faced by IP accounts of consciousness it that they feel 
incomplete.  This shortfall is referred to as ‘the explanatory gap’ which—although it is not 
always cast in these terms—is centrally concerned with information processing, as Joseph 
Levine (who coined the term) makes clear: 
The basic problem [constituting the explanatory gap] is this. If we consider the sequence of events 
that begin, say, with light reflected off a ripe tomato and ending with a visual experience of a red 
shape, the role of the intervening physical events, from detection of the light by retinal receptors 
to activity in the visual cortex, seems to be solely a matter of implementing certain causal‐
informational roles. That is, so long as we are looking for an information‐processing story, we have 
an idea how appeal to the neurological events in the visual system could explain its 
implementation. But when we reflect on what we want explained when considering the nature of 
conscious visual experience, we see that it is not exhausted by the information concerning the 
external world it undoubtedly contains. We want to know, as well, why it is like what it is like for us 
to have this experience. Why do red things look just that way and green things differently, and 
why is there not a ‘way it's like’ for cameras connected to computers to detect the very same 
information? (Bayne, et al., 2009)  
To put that in the terms of this paper, it seems that we can provide satisfactory rational 
accounts (‘information processing stories’) of the processes of perception, but the same 
accounts do not satisfy the feeling (the ‘what is it like?’) of the experiences themselves.  Why 
should this be?   The matter might be intractable were it not that the type of account being 
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looked for here is in fact already available to us: ‘information processing stories’ are not our 
sole representational resource, because we have other—equally compelling—modes of 
communication, such as the arts, which provide just the kind of fulfilling representation of 
certain kinds of conscious experience (such as looking at a ripe tomato) that the explanatory 
gap identifies as being absent from information-based accounts.  Hence the 
incommensurability of the sciences and the arts has a direct bearing on the explanatory gap. 
The explanatory gap draws attention to the need for close attention to the question of 
representation in our accounts of consciousness.  Without that attention, not only will the 
explanatory gap remain unresolved, but we will be left with a fundamental asymmetry in the 
discussion of consciousness itself.  How so?  Because rational thought—to the degree that it 
has been taken as cognate with information-processing and the ordered representations of 
science—has been largely passed over as a mode of consciousness, and ‘the problem of 
consciousness’ has come to be assigned chiefly to sensory experience instead, usually under 
the rubric of ‘qualia’ (i.e. noumenal consciousness has been overlooked, and phenomenal 
consciousness has been identified as the ‘problem’).  This is evident in Levine’s account 
whereby the ‘information-processing story’ is implicitly a scientific account, and knowing that 
account is treated as inherently unproblematic, with the problem of consciousness only 
arising with the question of feeling (the ‘what it is like for us’).  But knowing is just as much a 
problem of consciousness as feeling is, and unless conscious thought is adequately 
differentiated from the unconscious information processing of machines, IP models will not 
only fail to provide an explanation of consciousness, but will continue to obscure the actual 
issues at stake. 
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